Terrorism and migration: An overview by Helbling, Marc & Meierrieks, Daniel
REVIEW ARTICLE
Terrorism and Migration: An Overview
Marc Helbling1,2* and Daniel Meierrieks2
1Department of Sociology, University of Mannheim, Bamberg, Germany and 2Department of Migration, Integration and
Transnationalization, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Berlin, Germany
*Corresponding author. E-mail: helbling@uni-mannheim.de
(Received 25 June 2020; revised 11 August 2020; accepted 4 September 2020)
Abstract
This article provides an overview of the literature on the relationship between terrorism and migration.
It discusses whether and how (1) migration may be a cause of terrorism, (2) terrorism may
influence natives’ attitudes towards immigration and their electoral preferences and (3) terrorism may
lead to more restrictive migration policies and how these in turn may serve as effective counter-terrorism
tools. A review of the empirical literature on the migration–terrorism nexus indicates that (1) there is little
evidence that more migration unconditionally leads to more terrorist activity, especially in Western coun-
tries, (2) terrorism has electoral and political (but sometimes short-lived) ramifications, for example, as
terrorism promotes anti-immigrant resentment and (3) the effectiveness of stricter migration policies
in deterring terrorism is rather limited, while terrorist attacks lead to more restrictive migration policies.
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Shortly after taking office in January 2017, US President Donald Trump issued Executive Order
13769, called ‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States’ (Trump
2017). This order instituted a number of immigration restrictions, especially concerning immi-
gration and travel from Muslim-majority countries to the United States. Explicitly referring to
the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, Trump (2017, 8977) argued that
these restrictions were necessary because
[n]umerous foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in terrorism-related
crimes since 11 September 2001, including foreign nationals who entered the United States
after receiving visitor, student, or employment visas, or who entered through the United
States refugee resettlement program.
Thus the purpose of these immigration restrictions (which included suspending the issuance
of visas and denying immigrants from certain countries entry into the United States) was ‘to pro-
tect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign nationals admitted to the United States’
(Trump 2017, 8977).1
Trump’s executive order is emblematic of how some politicians relate terrorism to immigra-
tion: migrants2 are regarded as a potential threat to domestic security given the chance they will
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Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1While the courts scrapped this early version of the so-called Muslim Travel Ban, a revised version (sometimes called the
‘Travel Ban 3.0’) was upheld and took effect later in 2017.
2A migrant is someone who migrates to a host country and who in theory possesses, and in practice exercises, the right to
settle. According to Schain (2008), we can differentiate between (1) voluntary migration, mainly for economic reasons (labor
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engage in terrorist activity. In recent years, Muslim immigration in particular has been considered
a security threat to Western societies (for example, Givens et al. 2009; Sides and Gross 2013).
Furthermore, as exemplified by Trump’s travel ban, the ostensible relationship between
terrorism and migration has public policy consequences. More generally, since the 9/11
attacks in the United States, many policy measures in fields such as surveillance, immigration
and foreign policy have been justified with the security threat that immigrants ostensibly
pose (for example, Chebel d’Appollonia 2012; Davis and Silver 2004; Givens et al., 2009;
Huddy et al. 2002). Consequently, the alleged effect of migration on terrorism will also
matter to electoral politics. For instance, Wright and Esses (2019) show that individuals who
perceived immigrants as a security concern were more likely to vote for Donald Trump, who
explicitly campaigned on an anti-immigration and tough-on-terror platform, in the 2016
US elections.
Motivated by recent political, electoral and security events such as the election and politics of
Donald Trump, the rise of right-wing anti-immigrant parties in Europe and a number of high-
profile terrorist attacks committed by migrants in the West (for example, the Paris attacks of
November 2015 and the Berlin attack of December 2016), we provide a state-of-the-art overview
of the literature on the migration–terrorism nexus.3 Virtually all studies that address the relation-
ship between migration and terrorism have been published over the last twenty years; many of
them are only a few years old. The topic has attracted research interest in various fields such
as economics, political science, sociology and social psychology. This allows us to consider the
migration–terrorism nexus from various and complementary viewpoints. When reviewing the
literature, we are interested in answering three (related) research questions:
(1) Does immigration lead to terrorism? In other words, is there empirical evidence to sup-
port the argument often raised in political and public debates that migration carries a risk
to national security in the form of terrorism?
(2) What are the electoral consequences of terrorism? In particular, to what extent do terrorist
attacks shape individual citizens’ views about immigration and their electoral preferences?
(3) What is the relationship between terrorism and migration policy? Does terrorism lead to
stricter migration policies, and do these measures, in turn, decrease the number of terror-
ist attacks a country experiences?
To answer these questions, we proceed as follows. After defining the term ‘terrorism’ and dis-
cussing its development across time and space, we review the literature that examines the role of
migration as a potential cause of terrorism. Here, we also study how terrorism may be related to
migration in origin countries. The next section focuses on the effects of terrorism in the destin-
ation countries. More specifically, we look at how terrorist attacks contribute to the politicization
and framing of migration as a security issue by affecting attitudes towards immigrants, electoral
behavior and migration policy making. The final section concludes.
migration) and on social grounds (family reunification), and (2) refugee migration. The later type of migration is involuntary;
according to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, refugees leave their home countries owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion. Refugee migration is far less common than labor migration; the International Organization for Migration reports a
global refugee population of approximately 26 million for 2018, while the number of international migrants was as high as
272 million for 2019 (IMO 2019, 3).
3Beyond terrorism, there are also other security issues related to migration that we do not discuss here. For example, migra-
tion may also be linked to the spread of civil wars (e.g. Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006) and the dynamics of interstate conflict
(e.g. Salehyan 2008). For further discussion, see Adamson (2006).
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Terrorism preliminaries
Definition of Terrorism
According to Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011, 321), terrorism can be defined as ‘[…] the
premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncom-
batants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audi-
ence beyond that of the immediate victims’.
According to this definition, terrorism is distinct from (1) unorganized forms of violent political
protest (including riots, mob violence), (2) non-political acts of violence (such as violent crime,
school shootings) and (3) violent repression by the government, that is, state terrorism (for
example, in the form of torture). Terrorism may, however, overlap with large-scale civil wars,
meaning that non-state actors may resort to both terrorism and more conventional guerilla warfare
in certain conflicts at the same time (for example, Gaibulloev and Sandler 2019: 291–292; Krieger
and Meierrieks 2011; for a general introduction to terrorism studies, see Enders and Sandler 2011).
Domestic terrorism is ‘homegrown [so that] the venue, target, and perpetrators are all from the
same country’ (Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler 2011, 321), while transnational terrorism con-
cerns more than one country. Prominent examples of transnational terrorism are the 9/11 attacks:
the perpetrators hailed from several Middle Eastern countries, while the attacks occurred in the
United States and victimized thousands of US and non-US citizens.
Since migrants are, by definition, foreign nationals, transnational terrorism is particularly rele-
vant for the study of the nexus between terrorism and migration. Transnational terrorism can be
divided into two categories: (1) terrorism carried out by immigrants (foreign nationals) in their
destination country, directed either against the inhabitants and institutions of the destination
country or against other foreign nationals and (2) terrorism committed by natives (inhabitants
of the destination country) against immigrants.
Trends in Transnational Terrorism since 1995
Figure 1 depicts global trends in transnational terrorism frequency and ferocity. The data used to
construct this figure are drawn from Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011) and Gaibulloev and
Sandler (2019). These authors use raw data from the Global Terrorism Database, first described in
LaFree and Dugan (2007), applying various calibration and recoding methods to differentiate
between domestic and transnational terrorism.4 On average, between 1995 and 2016 there
were approximately 320 transnational terrorist attacks with approximately 810 deaths per year.
Transnational terrorism was fairly persistent with respect to its frequency and ferocity between
the mid-1990s and 2010, with the noticeable exception of the spike in terrorism lethality in
2001 due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It became more common and deadly after 2010.
Table 1 shows that since the end of the Cold War, transnational terrorism has primarily
affected countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. However, rich and industrialized
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD) countries have also been
affected. Left-wing transnational terrorism has become less common after the end of the Cold
War due to the loss of popular support for (and state sponsorship of) left-wing terrorist groups;
however, pockets of this type of terrorism still exist, such as in Colombia (the ELN) and India (the
Naxalites). Yet, post-1995 transnational terrorism has been much more strongly dominated by
nationalist-separatist (for example, the Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës in Serbia/Kosovo) and espe-
cially religious-Islamist terrorist groups, for example, in Afghanistan (the Taliban), Iraq and Syria
(Islamic State), Somalia (al-Shabaab) and Algeria (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). These
trends in transnational terrorism are also described in more detail in Gaibulloev and Sandler
(2019, 278–291).
4This is necessary because the database does not differentiate between domestic and transnational terrorism. The data from
Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011) and Gaibulloev and Sandler (2019) are available until 2016.
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In sum, the stylized facts about transnational terrorism since 1995 tell us that (1) it concerns
many parts of the world, particularly (2) many countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East from
which migration to Western countries originates, while (3) the overall risk of transnational ter-
rorism (as expressed by its frequency and lethality) tends to be rather marginal, notwithstanding
the ‘outlier’ of the 9/11 attacks.
Migration as a Cause of Transnational Terrorism
Theoretical Considerations
In this section, we discuss the empirical evidence on the potential effect of migration on terror-
ism. To theoretically understand how migration may affect terrorism, we employ a rational-choice
model of terrorism. This model is the theoretical basis for many social science investigations of
terrorism.5 In short, it assumes that terrorists are rational actors who weigh the benefits of ter-
rorism (such as achieving certain political goals) against its costs (for example, capture) and
opportunity costs (for example, foregone earnings from non-violence when engaging in terror-
ism). Potential terrorists opt for violence (non-violence) when the benefits of terrorism outweigh
its costs (benefits).
Migration may affect this terrorist calculus in two ways. First, it may make terrorism less costly.
For instance, foreign terrorist organizations can use existing migration networks and routes to get
terrorist operatives (for example, in the form of ‘sleeper cells’) into foreign countries at low costs,
making subsequent terrorist activity by these operatives more probable. Similarly, foreign terrorist
organizations can potentially rely on existing migrant communities in destination countries,
so-called diasporas. Diasporas can be considered networks that provide their members with social
bonds that produce mutual emotional and social support and reinforce common identities (for
example, Sageman 2004). Terrorist organizations linked to these diasporas (for example, due to a
shared religious or ethnic background) can exploit these pre-existing networks for the purpose of
radicalization, recruitment, financing, intelligence gathering and as safe havens (for example,
Sageman 2004, 2011; Sheffer 2006). This ought to lower the operating costs of terrorist organiza-
tions and thus make terrorism – ceteris paribus – more likely.
Figure 1. Global trends in trans-
national terrorism, 1995–2016
Sources: Global Terrorism Database;
Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011),
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2019).
5Seminal contributions to the rational-choice analysis of terrorism can be found in, e.g., Landes (1978) and Sandler,
Tschirhart and Cauley (1983). Caplan (2006) provides a more recent discussion of rational-choice models of terrorism.
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Secondly, these very diasporas and migrant communities may also be subject to discrimination
in destination countries such as in the form of religious intolerance or exclusion from the labor
market or political representation (for example, Sheffer 2006). Discrimination is a powerful pre-
dictor of terrorism (for example, Piazza 2012; Saiya 2019). It makes terrorism a more attractive
option by lowering its opportunity costs, for example as opportunities for non-violent economic
or political participation are constrained. Consequently, as migration leads to the growth of dia-
sporas, it may also lead to the growth of grievances (due to discrimination) that could fuel ter-
rorist violence by migrants.
The Effect of Migration on Terrorism in Destination Countries
Three large-N studies investigate the effect of migration on terrorism in the destination country of
migration. First, Bove and Böhmelt (2016) study this relationship for a sample of 145 countries
between 1970 and 2000. They find that increases in migrant inflows lead to fewer terrorist attacks.
Secondly, Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt (2020) examine migration from 183 origin to 20
OECD countries in a dyadic setting and come to the opposite conclusion: a larger number of
foreigners leads to more terrorist activity in the host country. Thirdly, Forrester et al. (2019)
use bilateral migration data for 170 countries (thereby also including South–South migration)
between 1995 and 2015, and find no evidence that immigration leads to more terrorism in des-
tination countries.
Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt (2020) argue that their finding of a positive effect of immigra-
tion on terrorism is a mere consequence of scale effects. It is well known from the literature on
the determinants of terrorism that more populous countries experience more terrorist activity
simply due to a larger pool of (potential) terrorist recruits and terrorist victims (for example,
Krieger and Meierrieks 2011). Indeed, Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt (2020) show that the effect
of foreign population growth on terrorism is not different from the effect of domestic population
growth, meaning that immigration does not disproportionately undermine security. At the same
time, this suggests that other theoretical mechanisms that could explain the link of migration and
terrorism (for example, lower infiltration and operating costs of terrorist groups or support from
diasporas) are not at play.
This leaves little evidence from large-N studies in favor of the hypothesis that immigration
unconditionally promotes terrorism in receiving countries. However, we can use the results of
Bove and Böhmelt (2016), Forrester et al. (2019) and Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt (2020)
as well as those of Böhmelt and Bove (2020a) to think about the conditional effects of immigration
on terrorism in a number of ways.





Mean number of transnational





Mean number of transnational
terrorism deaths per one
million inhabitants
1 Afghanistan Libya United States Iraq
2 United Kingdom Lebanon Iraq Afghanistan
3 France Afghanistan Afghanistan Somalia
4 Iraq Somalia India Lebanon
5 Pakistan Iraq Pakistan Libya
6 Colombia C. Afr. Republic Somalia Israel
7 Somalia Serbia Algeria C. Afr. Republic
8 Germany Greece Egypt Burundi
9 Libya Israel Colombia Syria
10 India United Kingdom Ethiopia Mali
Note: this list only considers countries that were always independent between 1995 and 2016 and that have more than one million
inhabitants. Countries in bold were OECD members as of 2016.
Sources: Global Terrorism Database; Enders, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2011), Gaibulloev and Sandler (2019).
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First, the composition of the migration influx may matter to the migration–terrorism relation-
ship. While Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt (2020) do not find that the gender mix of migration
plays a role, they are able to show that high-skilled immigration actually reduces the risk of ter-
rorism. For instance, more educated migrants may be more likely to integrate into destination
country societies, thus having fewer reasons to resort to terrorism (due to the high opportunity
costs of terrorism). In a similar vein, Bove and Böhmelt (2016, 586) argue that their result of a
negative effect of immigration on terrorism may be due to ‘side effects of human capital’, since
high-skilled individuals are usually over-represented in migration flows.6 For example, high-
skilled individuals may find it easier to participate in the labor markets of destination countries;
this will result in higher opportunity costs of terrorism and – ceteris paribus – lower levels of par-
ticipation in terrorism.
Secondly, the origin of migrants may also play a role. Prior research in this area focuses on the
influx of migrants from (1) Muslim-majority countries (given the rise and thus possible ‘import’
of religious-Islamist extremism) and (2) conflict- and terror-ridden countries (given the potential
dangers of ‘importing’ foreign conflict). With regard to Muslim migration, both Forrester et al.
(2019) and Dreher, Gassebner, and Schaudt (2020) find that migration from Muslim-majority
countries is not systematically associated with more terrorism in receiving countries. The evi-
dence is somewhat more divided when it comes to the role of migration from conflict-ridden
states. Bove and Böhmelt (2016) find that migration from conflict-ridden countries can be an
important vehicle for the diffusion of terrorism. Bove and Böhmelt (2016, 576) argue that ‘migra-
tion flows from terrorism-prone countries facilitate the diffusion of terrorism in the host country
by providing a dense framework of prior trusted relationships among the migrants’ that terrorist
organizations can exploit for recruitment and radicalization, given a shared national, ethnic or
religious background of terrorist group and diaspora members. However, they also note that
while their results indicate that terrorism may travel from one country to another via migration,
this migration – beyond the diffusion channel – will not need to automatically lead to more ter-
rorism in destination countries (Bove and Böhmelt 2016, 585). Indeed, using migration from
terror-prone countries as a predictor and thus testing the total effect of emigration from conflict-
prone countries, neither Forrester et al. (2019) nor Dreher, Gassebner, and Schaudt (2020) find
evidence that migration from conflict-intense countries shares a special relationship with terror-
ism in receiving countries.
Thirdly, conditions in the destination country may also affect the migration–terrorism nexus.
In particular, conditions that are conducive to immigrants’ integration can reduce the risk of ter-
rorism committed by migrant populations. Studying migration into OECD countries between
1980 and 2010, Böhmelt and Bove (2020a) find that cultural proximity between the migrants’
home and destination countries reduces the cross-border diffusion of terrorism. Here, similar
identities and values may facilitate integration and reduce the incentives to engage in terrorism
against the host country (Böhmelt and Bove 2020a). This suggests that while cultural proximity
ought to lower the costs of terrorist infiltration, this effect is outweighed by its concurrent effect
on integration, which ought to increase the opportunity costs of terrorism.
Refugee Migration and Terrorism in Host Countries
While previous empirical studies have examined the general relationship between migration and
terrorism, another set of studies examine the relationship between involuntary migration and ter-
rorism. Three large-N studies by Choi and Salehyan (2013), Milton, Spencer and Findley (2013)
6High-skilled individuals are more likely to emigrate, resulting in positive self-selection into out-migration. This is because
international migration will allow especially skilled labor to maximize their income. See, e.g., Grogger and Hanson (2011) for
a further discussion.
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and Polo and Wucherpfennig (2019) investigate the effect of refugee inflows on terrorism in the
receiving country.
Choi and Salehyan (2013) use data for 154 countries for the years 1970–2007, and find that
countries that host refugees are more likely to experience terrorist activity. They argue that this
relationship can be explained by poor conditions in refugee camps that make participation in ter-
rorist violence more attractive. Similarly, Milton, Spencer and Findley (2013), using a dyadic
framework, show that refugee flows significantly increase transnational terrorism that occurs in
the host country. As in Choi and Salehyan (2013), they argue that this unfavorable relationship
can be explained by the poor treatment of refugees in host countries in general and harsh con-
ditions in refugee camps in particular. Both transmission channels would imply comparatively
low opportunity costs of terrorism, for example, as the possibilities of refugee participation in
the labor market are limited. By contrast, Polo and Wucherpfennig (2019) challenge the notion
that hosting refugees leads to more terrorism against nationals of the host country. They claim
that any increase in terrorism due to the inflow of refugees that is observed at the country
level is due to scapegoating – that is, refugees becoming the target (rather than the perpetrators)
of terrorism.
Refugee migration is a special kind of migration. Indeed, the evidence on the effect of refugee
migration on terrorism helps more clearly identify the conditions under which migration
more generally may result in increased terrorist activity in several ways. First, refugee migrants
are less likely to self-select into migration, meaning that – in contrast to voluntary labor
migration – the educated are less likely to be over-represented. The (relative) lack of human cap-
ital endowment of refugees may complicate their economic and social integration into host soci-
eties and thus make refugee migrants – in contrast to more educated labor migrants – more
vulnerable to politico-economic hardship and discrimination. This could ultimately lead to ter-
rorism by refugees as a means to voice dissent and achieve politico-economic relief. Secondly, by
definition, refugee migrants predominantly come from countries affected by conflict and repres-
sion (for example, Echevarria and Gardeazabal 2016). This may make it more likely that terrorist
organizations can recruit refugees into their ranks, ‘weaponizing’ the refugees’ experience with
violence in their host country. Thirdly, the conditions under which refugees live in their host coun-
tries are usually less conducive to integration compared to regular migrants. For instance, refugee
camps are important breeding grounds of refugee terrorism, but voluntary labor migrants would
not live in such camps. This again speaks to the idea that the treatment of migrants (for example,
in terms of immigration and integration policies) can condition the effect of migration on terror-
ism. Indeed, Polo and Wucherpfennig (2019) show that refugees will not attack nationals of their
host country especially in developed countries, presumably because refugees are treated better in
richer countries. Similarly, Böhmelt, Bove and Gleditsch (2019a) show that while a refugee influx
may fuel domestic conflict between refugees and locals, this effect is especially prevalent in coun-
tries characterized by low levels of state capacity (such as those with a weak state bureaucracy). This
latter effect is especially relevant to the refugee migration–terrorism nexus, as refugee flows tend to
cluster in the direct neighborhood of conflict-ridden countries; these countries in turn also tend to
lack sound institutions and economic resources to effectively manage these refugee flows.
Terrorism against Migrants in Destination Countries
Migrants may not only be the perpetrators of terrorism; they may also be its victims. The native
population may respond to (increased) immigration with fear and hostility. For example,
migrants can be perceived as labor market competitors, burdens to domestic welfare systems
or threats to native cultural identity (for example, McAlexander 2020). Applying a rational-choice
model of terrorism, the inflow of migrants can make anti-immigrant terrorism more likely
because (1) there is a larger pool of potential targets (which lowers the costs of carrying out anti-
immigrant violence) and (2) immigration may lower the opportunity costs of anti-immigrant
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violence for host country locals (for example, as labor market competition crowds out part of the
native population). Migrants and refugees may also be scapegoated when they can be linked (for
example, due to religious or ethnic affiliation) to external terrorist threats that are relevant to the
host country’s native population (Polo and Wucherpfennig 2019). Through these pathways, ter-
rorism against non-natives can become more likely as immigration increases. This ought to espe-
cially pertain to right-wing terrorism, which is usually animated by rabid nativism and
xenophobia.
Indeed, empirical evidence by McAlexander (2020) on a set of Western European countries
between 1980 and 2004 strongly suggests that a larger number of refugees and non-European
immigrants is associated with more right-wing terrorist activity. Interestingly, he finds no evi-
dence that migration flows affect left-wing terrorism in a similar manner, which indicates that
it is indeed only a specific sub-set of terrorism that responds to migration. This finding is com-
plemented by the large-N evidence of Polo and Wucherpfennig (2019, 3), who show that refugee
stocks from countries that experience terrorist activity are more likely to be victimized by
right-wing terrorism in their host country, suggesting that these refugees are perceived as security
threats and thus scapegoated by the native population.
Given a lack of further large-N evidence, we can supplement the aforementioned results by
looking at evidence from Germany on the relationship between immigration and right-wing vio-
lence. Germany is an interesting case study because it experienced two periods of increased immi-
gration after the end of the Cold War (the early 1990s and the post-2015 period) that were also
accompanied by a marked increase in right-wing violence.7 Indeed, Krueger and Pischke (1997),
Koopmans and Olzak (2004), and Braun and Koopmans (2010) provide statistical evidence that
the number of foreigners, immigrants, and asylum seekers at the regional or state levels in
Germany was linked to more right-wing violence against foreigners and immigrants in the
1990s, especially in East Germany. Similarly, investigating the post-2015 period that was charac-
terized by a record influx of refugees into Germany, Jäckle and König (2017, 2018) find that the
strength of right-wing parties in a district as well as anti-immigrant rhetoric, partly prompted by
terrorist attacks in neighboring countries, considerably boosted the probability of attacks on refu-
gees in the areas under study. In other words, their studies suggest that ideological predispositions
determine how locals respond to (increased) immigration.
While limited, the empirical evidence thus suggests that (1) migrants can indeed be victimized
and (2) anti-migrant terrorism is primarily committed by right-wing groups. In light of these
findings, the results of Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt (2020) could point to a vicious circle
between anti-immigrant terrorism and terrorism by migrants. They show that terrorist attacks
against foreigners in their host countries increase the risk that foreign populations will likewise
resort to terrorism.
The Migration–Terrorism Nexus in the Origin Countries of Migration
The migration–terrorism nexus may also be related to the origin countries of migration in two
ways: (1) terrorism may be a cause of out-migration and (2) communities of migrants in foreign
countries may influence terrorist conflicts in their home countries.
Concerning terrorism as a cause of population out-flows, domestic conflicts obviously trigger
forced or refugee migration (for example, Echevarria and Gardeazabal 2016). However, terrorism
may also affect voluntary labor migration. Dreher, Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) consider labor
migration from 152 countries to the OECD between 1976 and 2000, and find that more terrorist
activity in origin countries leads to more high-skilled migration to OECD countries. They argue
7For an analysis of the relationship between right-wing violence and immigration in further European countries in the late
1980s and early 1990s, see Koopmans (1996). He shows that a larger refugee population may contribute to more right-wing
and racist violence.
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that terrorism reduces economic opportunities at home (for example, by adversely affecting trade
and foreign investment) and therefore decreases the returns to education, making it more attract-
ive to migrate, especially when one is highly educated. This large-N evidence is complemented by
the results of Belmonte (2019), who studies the effect of (separatist) terrorism in South Tyrol on
out-migration. He similarly finds that skilled workers are more likely than unskilled workers to
leave areas that are exposed to terrorist attacks.
After migration or flight, diasporas in foreign countries may still influence terrorist activity in
their home countries. For instance, migrants may send money to support terrorist groups at
home. Indeed, Mascarenhas and Sandler (2014) show that such remittances are linked to more ter-
rorist activity in the remittances-receiving country, suggesting that these types of payments help fill
the war chests of terrorist organizations that are active in the migrants’ home country. In a similar
vein, Piazza (2018) studies how transnational ethnic diasporas affect the resolution of campaigns by
terrorist groups to which these diasporas are linked. He finds that such terrorist campaigns are less
likely to end (for example, through military means or the political process) than campaigns without
diaspora links, arguing that diasporas provide material support to sustain them.
Given their importance as potential reservoirs of material support, diasporas are also import-
ant audiences for terrorist groups that depend on their support. Here, Piazza and LaFree (2019)
find that Islamist terrorist organizations are more likely to refrain from high-casualty terrorism
when they are dependent upon diaspora backing. They argue that such acts will adversely affect
diaspora communities when they can be linked to these attacks (for example, because such attacks
increase fear and distrust against them in their host countries), leading terrorist organizations to
forego such attacks to protect their diaspora support.
The Effects of Terrorism on Attitudes Towards Immigrants, Electoral Behavior and
Immigration Policies
Theoretical Framework
In this section, we examine the effects of terrorism in destination countries in the context of three
interrelated linkages: (1) the effect of terrorism on natives’ attitudes towards immigration, (2) the
effect of terrorism on electoral outcomes and (3) the role of terrorism in migration policy making.
Figure 2 outlines a theoretical framework consisting of the main elements and their relation-
ships as they are discussed in the literature. First, it illustrates that transnational terrorism might
affect public perceptions of (and attitudes towards) immigrants and migration (A). More pre-
cisely, fear and actual or perceived threats from transnational terrorism might translate into stron-
ger anti-immigration sentiment; these sentiments may be triggered by transnational terrorism in
one’s home country as well as in neighboring or far away countries. Secondly, anti-immigrant
sentiment ought to fuel support for (right-wing) anti-immigrant political parties. This may
reduce the re-election chances of governments with different ideological orientations (B1).
Terrorism may also affect electoral outcomes through other pathways (B2), for example by redu-
cing economic activity and life satisfaction in targeted countries. These effects may further reduce
the electoral success of incumbent governments. By endangering their political survival, trans-
national terrorism consequently creates powerful incentives for governments to enact more
restrictive migration policies (C). Governments may expect harsher policies to serve as a political
signal to the electorate and thus siphon off political support for right-wing or opposition parties.
At the same time, restrictive migration policies may help reducing transnational terrorist activity
(D). For instance, stricter immigration policies may increase the costs of terrorist infiltration and
thus reduce the level of terrorist activity directed against the country pursuing such policies. By
reducing (future) transnational terrorism, governments may be able to restore electoral confi-
dence and limit economic damage due to terrorism, further increasing the government’s chances
of political survival.
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Terrorism’s Effects on Attitudes towards Immigrants
In general, we expect attitudes towards immigrants to become more negative in the context of
terrorism. Actual or perceived threat is one of the most important explanatory factors for such
attitudes or changes in attitudes (for example, Huddy et al. 2005). That is, terrorism is perceived
as a threat to personal and national security; this leads to heightened fear of the other, increased
ethnocentrism, prejudice and xenophobia as well as stronger ties to native identity, all of which,
in turn, promote more negative attitudes towards migrants (for example, Hellwig and Sinno 2017;
Hitlan et al. 2007; LeVine and Campbell 1972; Schimel et al. 1999).
A first group of studies investigates the effects of terrorism on attitudes towards immigrants in
the context of the 9/11 attacks. The evidence indicates that these attacks affected Americans’ feel-
ings of security and led to higher levels of fear and anxiety (for example, Huddy et al. 2002;
Huddy, Khatib and Capelos 2003). What is more, a number of studies found that in the wake
of these attacks, prejudices and discrimination against Muslims increased in many Western states
(for example, Allen and Nielsen 2002; Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede 2006; Sheridan
2006). This increase in xenophobia and Islamophobia in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also
coincided with more negative views on immigration not only in the United States but also in
other Western countries. For instance, Aslund and Rooth (2005) show that negative views on
immigrants increased in Sweden after the 9/11 attacks. In Germany, more people supported a
reduction in immigration after the attacks (Noelle-Neumann 2002). Schüller (2016) studies
panel data and observes a shift towards more negative attitudes toward immigration and a
decrease in concerns over xenophobia in Germany in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
Some evidence indicates that the adverse effect of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on prejudices and
xenophobia was rather short-lived. Panagopoulos (2006) finds that prejudices increased in the
United States after the 9/11 attacks but receded to pre-9/11 levels shortly thereafter. Similarly,
Kalkan and Uslaner (2012) found no important changes in Islamophobic attitudes in the
United States when comparing the pre- and post-9/11 period. Hopkins (2010) provides the
most convincing test of the effect of the 9/11 attacks on immigration attitudes. He investigates
panel survey data from the fall of 2000, October 2001 and March 2002. He finds an important
short-term impact on attitudes toward immigrants: respondents were more likely to agree with
the assessment that immigrants have become too demanding in the aftermath of the attack.
While this change in attitudes implies increased hostility towards migrants, Hopkins (2010)
also shows that these changes in attitudes had already receded by March 2002.
While almost all studies that investigate effects on attitudes due to 9/11 compare survey data
before and after the attacks, a second group of studies takes advantage of attacks that occurred
Figure 2. Theoretical framework
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during the field phase of surveys. Boomgaarden and De Vreese (2007) and Finseraas, Jakobsson
and Kotsadam (2011) use this quasi-natural experimental research design to investigate the
effects of the assassination of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a radical Islamist in
2004. Here, Boomgaarden and De Vreese (2007) rely on their own survey data from the
Netherlands, and find that while the murder did not affect general attitudes towards immigrants,
immigrants and immigrants’ religion were nevertheless more likely to be considered cultural or
security threats. Finseraas, Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2011) use data from the European Social
Survey (ESS) to show that preferences for more restrictive immigration policies increased.
However, this was not the case for the Netherlands but for three of the 17 other European coun-
tries in the study. This finding, similar to evidence compiled on the 9/11 attacks, suggests
substantial heterogeneity in and the potential cross-border diffusion of terrorism-induced anti-
immigration views.
Finseraas and Listhaug (2013) and Legewie (2013) examine similar cross-border effects of ter-
rorism. In both papers, ESS data on attitudes towards migrants in European countries is corre-
lated with large-scale terrorist attacks outside the Western world in quasi-natural experiments.
For the 2008 Mumbai attacks (India), Finseraas and Listhaug (2013) find an increasing fear of
terrorism but no increasing support for illiberal immigration policies among European respon-
dents. Focusing on the 2002 Bali attacks (Indonesia), Legewie (2013) finds that attitudes towards
immigrants became more negative after the attacks. However, this effect was limited to three out
of nine investigated countries and disappeared after approximately one month.
The evidence so far suggests that (1) while terrorism can negatively affect attitudes towards
migrants, leading to more hostility among the native population, (2) these effects tend to be
short-lived and not uniform across countries. Also, (3) terrorist activity in one country may affect
– via media coverage and other communication networks – immigration attitudes in other
countries.
These findings are corroborated by a third group of very recent empirical studies that examine
the effects of large-scale terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States. The most prominent
example is the November 2015 Paris attacks in which 130 people were killed at the Saint-Denis
football stadium, several restaurants and especially the Bataclan concert hall. Jungkunz, Helbling
and Schwemmer (2019) investigate the impact of the 2015 Paris attacks with a German student
sample and differentiate between attitudes towards immigrants that could be related to the attacks
(Muslims) and those that could not (Christian). They find that attitudes towards Muslims became
more negative among right-wing but not left-wing students; attitudes towards Christian refugees
were not affected. Once again, this suggests terrorism has heterogeneous effects on attitudes. Van
Assche and Dierckx (2019) use a student and a convenience sample in Belgium to investigate the
effects of the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks. They find no changes in attitudes towards
different out-groups among respondents. Boydstun, Feezell and Glazier (2018) come to a similar
conclusion when studying Americans’ feelings towards Muslims after the 2015 attacks in Paris
and San Bernardino; they find that these attacks had no discernible effects on attitudes.
Finally, Mancosu, Ferrin and Cappiali (2018) investigate the effect of the 2017 Manchester bomb-
ings in the UK. While they find that these attacks led to a negative response (increased stereotyp-
ing) towards immigrants and refugees in the immediate aftermath of the attack, this effect
disappeared after a few days.
Several empirical studies also test for the existence of cross-border spillover effects of terrorism
on attitudes, and study the role of contextual factors in shaping such effects. Analyzing
Eurobarometer data from twenty-eight countries in November 2015, Ferrin, Mancosu and
Cappiali (2020) find that the Paris attacks had a negative effect on attitudes towards immigrants,
especially for educated and left-wing respondents in countries with a more positive political cli-
mate towards immigrants. According to them, such attacks especially affected people whose
stereotypes were disconfirmed. Castanho (2018) looks at the same data and investigates potential
backlash and polarization effects. To strengthen the robustness of his analyses, he also evaluates
British Journal of Political Science 11
ESS data that were in the field in January during the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris. He
finds no important changes in immigration preferences. Using the same Eurobarometer data,
Nussio, Bove and Steele (2019) show that terrorism leads to increases in negative attitudes
towards migrants and refugees, particularly in countries that have a relatively low immigrant
population. Böhmelt, Bove and Nussio (2020) test the proximity argument, which maintains
that proximity to terrorism (even in other countries) will increase the likelihood of responding
to it due to a heightened fear of terrorism. Using a sample that includes all terrorist attacks in
Europe between 2003 and 2017, they come to the conclusion that terrorism both at home and
abroad leads to more negative attitudes towards immigrants.
Impact of Terrorism on Electoral Outcomes
By fueling support for anti-immigrant sentiment among natives, transnational terrorism may be
conducive to the electoral success of populist and mainstream right-wing parties that oppose
immigration (Abou-Chadi and Krause 2020). Indeed, there is considerable evidence that negative
attitudes towards immigrants increase support for these types of political parties (for example,
Coffé and Voorpostel 2010; Ivarsflaten 2007; Rydgren 2008; Oesch 2008).
For Turkey, Kibris (2011) shows that the number of police forces killed at the district level
between 1991 and 1995 by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party led to increased support for right-wing
parties. Similarly, focusing on Israel, Berrebi and Klor (2008) show that right-wing parties receive
more votes when Israeli localities are affected by terrorism. In a similar vein, Getmansky and
Zeitzoff (2014) find that right-wing support increases in areas in Israel that are affected by rocket
attacks from the Gaza Strip. There is an effect even if localities are not targeted but lie within the
rockets’ range. Thus the mere risk of being victimized tends to change voting behavior in favor of
right-wing parties.
While some evidence plausibly links terrorism, anti-immigrant views and electoral outcomes,
it remains circumstantial, as the role of anti-immigrant views in the nexus between transnational
terrorism and right-wing voting has not been directly tested. Right-wing parties may also plaus-
ibly benefit – more generally – from tough-on-terror and law-and-order stances after terrorist
attacks, which complicates interpretations of how strongly anti-immigrant views induced by ter-
rorism contribute to overall right-wing success at the voting booth.
At the same time, the literature on electoral accountability and retrospective voting suggests
that evaluations of the incumbent government also affect election outcomes (for example,
Barro 1973; De Vries and Giger 2014; Ferejohn 1986). Healy and Malhotra (2013) provide an
overview of the literature. Importantly, terrorism is expected to adversely affect economic condi-
tions in affected countries, for example by depressing trade and investment (for example,
Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides 2004; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2019: 316–320; Meierrieks and
Gries 2013). By adversely affecting economic growth and producing fear and stress, terrorism
is also anticipated to reduce overall life satisfaction (for example, Farzanegan, Krieger and
Meierrieks 2017; Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer 2009). Through these effects, terrorism ought to
lead to an unfavorable evaluation of the incumbent government’s performance and thus make
the electoral success of incumbent governments less likely.
Indeed, there is evidence that the electorate might hold the government accountable for ter-
rorism and punish them at the ballot box. For instance, national elections took place in Spain
in March 2004, only three days after bombs exploded in several commuter trains in Madrid, kill-
ing almost 200 people. Bali (2007) finds that these attacks influenced turnout and voting deci-
sions and led to the replacement of the incumbent government. Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin and
Mierau (2008) find that the Spanish experience can be generalized. In a study of 800 elections
in 115 countries between 1968 and 2002, they show that terrorism increases the probability of
government replacement after an election, and the severity of the terrorist attack amplifies this
effect. It is also possible that terrorism can promote government support and thus its re-election
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chances via a rally effect. For instance, Hetherington and Nelson (2003) show that the US gov-
ernment benefitted from such a rally effect after the 9/11 attacks. However, rally effects appear
to be rather elusive, which explains why governments will ultimately be more likely to be
voted out of office after a terrorist attack (Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau 2008).
In sum, terrorism may affect voting behavior and electoral outcomes by (1) strengthening anti-
immigrant sentiment and thus benefitting right-wing (anti-immigration) parties and (2) inducing
adverse socio-economic shocks that reduce voter satisfaction with the incumbent government.
This creates powerful incentives for incumbent governments to introduce more restrictive immi-
gration policies. Indeed, we have reason to believe that the introduction of new immigration pol-
icies affects political parties’ electoral support. For instance, while not accounting for
transnational terrorism, Abou-Chadi and Helbling (2018) demonstrate that both restrictive
and liberal policy reforms affect issue voting.
There are two reasons why implementing more restrictive immigration policies may help
incumbent governments. First, more restrictive immigration policies may satisfy public demand
for policies that increase safety, especially when terrorism and immigration policies are linked in
the public discourse (for example, Huysman 2006; Messina 2014). This, in turn, is expected to
contribute to electoral success. For instance, Wright and Esses (2019) show that individuals
who linked terrorism to immigration and consequently perceived immigration as a security threat
were more likely to vote for Donald Trump, who explicitly campaigned on an anti-immigration
platform, in the 2016 US elections. Secondly, predictions from a rational-choice model of terror-
ism suggest that implementing harsher immigration policies will increase the costs of terrorism
(for example, by making it more difficult to launch cross-border attacks), thereby reducing
future levels of terrorist activity directed against the country pursuing such policies. This
ought to limit socio-economic damage due to terrorism and thus restore electoral confidence,
therefore increasing the re-election chances of incumbent governments.
Effects of Terrorism on Immigration Policies
The logic of political survival would seem to suggest that incumbent politicians will respond to
transnational terrorism (that is, terrorism by foreign nationals) by introducing more restrictive
immigration policies.8 This is because citizens – either due to increased fear, stronger anti-
immigrant sentiment or due to economic anxiety when facing the socio-economic costs of ter-
rorism – are likely to demand more restrictive immigration policies and vote for political parties
that promise such policy changes.
Indeed, a number of analysts have found that immigration policies became more restrictive in
response to the 9/11 attacks. For instance, Waslin (2009) discusses the negative effects of immi-
gration policy changes enacted after 9/11 for the Latino population in the United States, whereas
Brown and Bean (2009) show that the tightening of visa review processes led to a decline in the
number of applications and admissions of international science and engineering students. Chebel
d’Appollonia (2012) shows that both American and European governments implemented stricter
border controls and even extraterritorial control mechanisms after 9/11. For her, however, these
measures mostly reinforced security logics that have been around since the 1970s (see also
Epifanio 2011). Luedtke (2009) also points to cross-border effects, arguing that 9/11 slowed
the European Union’s development towards a more harmonized European immigration and asy-
lum regulations.
While these studies are qualitative in nature and focus on the 9/11 attacks as a special case,
more recent empirical studies seek to provide quantitative and more general evidence regarding
the effect of terrorism on migration policy making. Helbling and Meierrieks (2020) study the
8Of course, in addition to migration policies, governments have a wide range of other counter-terrorism tools at their dis-
posal. For an overview and discussion of these tools, see, e.g., Schneider, Brück and Meierrieks (2015).
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effect of transnational terrorism on migration policies in thirty OECD countries between 1980
and 2010. They find that higher levels of exposure to transnational terrorism are associated
with stricter migration controls, but not stricter migration regulations regarding immigration eli-
gibility criteria and conditions. The effects are particularly strong when the attacks are ferocious
and occur after the end of the Cold War. For the same set of countries and time period, Bove,
Böhmelt and Nussio (2020) show that states also implement more restrictive immigration policies
when terrorist attacks happen in nearby countries. This once more points to potential diffusion
effects associated with transnational terrorism. Finally, Choi (2019) studies the effect of terrorism
on twenty-three immigration-receiving countries between 1970 and 2010; his sample includes
developed (OECD) and developing countries (for example, Botswana) as well as several emerging
markets (such as Brazil). In contrast to the former two studies, Choi (2019) finds that immigra-
tion policies are not responsive to terrorist activity.
In sum, these quantitative studies suggest that while transnational terrorism can indeed be pol-
icy relevant, this relationship is not necessarily straightforward. For one, there appear to be dif-
ferences between rich and democratic (OECD) and less wealthy and democratic countries, which
could explain the different findings of Helbling and Meierrieks (2020) and Bove, Böhmelt and
Nussio (2020) in comparison to Choi (2019). For instance, electoral accountability and other
democratic mechanisms may induce a more pronounced response to terrorism in OECD econ-
omies; however, future research is necessary to provide evidence to support this hypothesis. For
another, countries may change their immigration policies in response to terrorism rather select-
ively (Helbling and Meierrieks 2020). For instance, Avdan (2014a) finds no evidence that
increased global transnational terrorist activity reduces asylum recognition rates, suggesting
that this humanitarian immigration policy is not affected by terrorism.
Indeed, while there may be political gains associated with framing migration as a security issue
in response to terrorism, other factors may limit this process. For example, Avdan (2014b) finds
that transnational terrorism affects visa policies, but that this effect declines with increasing levels
of economic interdependence between involved states, suggesting that other considerations (for
example, gains from economic integration) also matter. Similarly, the political elite tends to be
much more cosmopolitan than the ‘common people’ and thus less susceptible to possible security
threats due to transnational terrorism and migration (Teney and Helbling 2014). For instance,
Lahav, Messina and Vasquez (2013) show that the immigration attitudes of members of the
European Parliament were not affected by the 9/11 terrorist attacks.9 What is more, powerful
interest groups may actually be interested in more immigration. That is, framing migration as
a security issue might contradict other policy goals such as the increase in the labor supply
through immigration that is desired by powerful political players (such as business owners)
(Boswell 2009). Consequently, the policy preferences of cosmopolitan elites and pro-immigration
interest groups that disfavor overly strict immigration policies will likely also be reflected in the
eventual immigration policy regime.
The Effectiveness of Migration Policies as Counter-Terrorism Policies
Finally, we review the evidence on the effectiveness of stricter migration policies to combat ter-
rorism. According to the rational-choice perspective introduced above, we should expect stricter
policies to affect the terrorist calculus in ways that increase the material costs of terrorism. For
instance, stricter policies may make it more difficult for terrorists to infiltrate other countries.
Böhmelt and Bove (2020b) investigate the role of migration policies in moderating the effect of
terrorism diffusion (via migration) for a sample of OECD economies. They find that ‘restrictive
9Similarly, Messina (2014) concludes that there is little empirical evidence that the migration–security nexus has become
more salient in politicians’ discourses due to terrorism. For him, most of the evidence regarding this question remains ‘anec-
dotal, episodic, unsystematically gathered, and/or difficult to compare across national cases’ (Messina 2014, 536).
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immigration policies may indeed make it more difficult for terrorism to diffuse across borders’
(Böhmelt and Bove 2020b, 176), suggesting that restrictive policies may help curb the risk of
transnational terrorism. However, they also stress that this effect is only relevant to ‘target coun-
tries with exceptionally lax [immigration] regulations and control mechanisms’ (Böhmelt and
Bove 2020b, 176), indicating that the overall effectiveness of migration policies as counter-
terrorism tools is limited.
Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt (2020) find that policies that restrict foreigners’ rights (for
example, by curtailing migrants’ access to social welfare programs and the labor market) and
enforce integration will actually lead to more terrorist activity. In particular, policies that are
too repressive may backfire by alienating parts of the migrant population (Dreher, Gassebner
and Schaudt 2020). Choi (2018) analyzes the effect of migration policies on terrorism for ten
Western industrialized democracies between 1970 and 2007 and obtains a similar finding. He
likens the impact of migration policies on terrorism to a ‘double-edged sword’ (Choi 2018,
21), finding that certain policies (such as governing the migrants’ path to citizenship) may indeed
encourage rather than deter terrorism. These findings suggest that in addition to affecting the
material costs of terrorism (where higher costs would reduce terrorism), immigration policies
may also affect the opportunity costs of terrorism, for example by aggravating migrants’ labor
market participation or integration efforts. Potentially, then, an unwise mix of migration policies
may produce undesired outcomes (more transnational terrorism), which will also run counter to
incumbent politicians’ desire to be re-elected.
Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2014) also advocate a sound migration policy mix in their theor-
etical analysis. They introduce a model in which developed countries may curb terrorism at
home by limiting unskilled and promoting skilled migration from developing (skill-scarce) countries.
For instance, attracting high-skilled labor will increase the standard of living of high-skilled workers
from developing countries (thus increasing their opportunity costs of violence), while at the same
time depriving foreign terrorist organizations of the human capital they would need to stage success-
ful cross-border terrorist attacks against the developed country (Bandyopadhyay and Sandler 2014).
Conclusion
The study of the migration–terrorism nexus first gained traction after the 9/11 attacks. More
recent terrorist attacks (such as the 2015 Paris attacks), developments in migration (for example,
the influx of refugees to Europe that started in 2015) and electoral events (for example, the elec-
tion of Donald Trump and other anti-immigrant and tough-on-terror politicians) have motivated
further analyses of the interplay among migration, terrorism, public policy and electoral politics.
The study of the migration–terrorism nexus is thus a relatively young and dynamic research field.
What is more, different disciplines (for example, political science, economics, sociology and social
psychology) have contributed to this research field, which might make it even more difficult to
keep track of the literature. Therefore, this review seeks to bring together different research
strands on transnational terrorism and migration and provide a state-of-the-art overview of
the literature, which can be summarized as follows.
First, there is little evidence that migration has an unconditional effect on terrorism that goes
beyond a mere mechanical scale effect. Thus the evidence indicates that migration per se is not a
Trojan horse of terrorism. However, migration may nevertheless lead to terrorism under unfavor-
able circumstances, especially when state capacity and socio-economic conditions in host coun-
tries are poor and detrimental to migrant and especially refugee integration. For instance, hostile
conditions in refugee camps may be associated with more transnational terrorism.
Secondly, the evidence more strongly suggests that migrants are victimized by (right-wing) ter-
rorism, for example serving as scapegoats for anti-immigration sentiment. This dimension of the
migration–terrorism nexus, however, remains underappreciated in the public discourse and
empirical studies.
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Thirdly, even though the empirical connection between migration and terrorism is tenuous
and by no means unconditional, such a link is still perceived to be valid in destination countries,
which, in turn, has several consequences. The evidence suggests that terrorism (1) fosters anti-
immigration sentiment (even though this effect can be short-lived), (2) benefits (right-wing) pol-
itical parties that hold nativist views, while damaging the electoral position of incumbent govern-
ments and (3) leads to stricter migration policies, even though this effect may be context specific
(for example, influenced by the relative strength of interest groups) and limited to specific types
of migration policies. We develop a theoretical framework that links these three effects, arguing
that transnational terrorism may create incentives for political incumbents to respond to terror-
ism with harsher migration policies to ensure their political survival.
Fourthly, there is little evidence that stricter migration policies actually result in less terrorism.
Rather, certain policies that alienate the migrant population appear to incite terrorism. This may
result in the worst of both worlds, with strict migration polices depressing economic growth (by
reducing labor migration) and harming rather than contributing to domestic security.
Fifthly, the migration–terrorism nexus is transnational in nature. This not only refers to the
cross-border flow of terrorist violence and people, but also to, for example, (1) the cross-border
diffusion of fear and anti-immigrant resentment due to terrorism, (2) the adaption of stricter
migration policies in response to terrorism in foreign countries and (3) feedback between terror-
ism and migration in sending and destination countries, for example, via diasporas and the cross-
border flow of information and remittances.
We hope our literature overview provides researchers with a starting point for future research
on the migration–terrorism nexus. In fact, we believe there are many potential areas for future
research. For instance, when studying the conditional effects of migration on terrorism, it may
be fruitful to also examine the roles of political factors (for example, interstate rivalries) and eco-
nomic variables (such as trade interdependencies) in governing the migration–terrorism relation-
ship. Similarly, it may be interesting to explicitly test (parts of) our theoretical framework
introduced above (Figure 2), for example by investigating how terrorism could affect migration
policy making and could thus be linked to electoral success. This framework could also be
extended both theoretically and through empirical testing to account for potentially more com-
plex linkages, for example by allowing for a reciprocal relationship between electoral outcomes
induced by terrorism (for instance, the success of right-wing parties) and the development of
anti-immigrant resentment. Considering migration policies in destination countries, there is
also a need to more thoroughly study how specific regulations shape the integration, assimilation
and participation of migrant populations. This could help explain why different migration policy
mixes appear to share a different relationship with terrorism, which could consequently further
improve immigration policy making. Finally, we would also like to encourage researchers to
examine the interaction between migration and security policy making in the context of trans-
national terrorism in non-democratic countries, given that the existing evidence – also due to
data constraints – tends to strongly focus on Western OECD democracies. For instance, it may
be interesting to analyze whether non-democratic countries – by nature of being less sensitive
to electoral demands – make different changes to their migration policy regime in response to
transnational terrorism.
Transnational terrorism and international migration will likely continue to be contentious
issues in the coming decades. Thus, in addition to inspiring further investigations of the
migration–terrorism nexus, we also hope that our literature overview provides some guidance
to policy makers as well as reassurance to the general public, for example concerning the alleged
perilousness of migration as a Trojan horse of terrorism.
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